Northern country. A tax on foreign-source income may dominate this, depending on the resource costs of enforcing such a tax.
2, TIHE ANALYTICAL MODEL

Basic Assumptions
I assume that there is a resource cost that must be borne for any Southern investment owned or financed by a Northern resident. This cost includes the expense of monitoring the firm or borrower and collecting information from afar. In practice the cost per unit of investment in prn.tice prob*ably varies inverscly with the scale of the investment, as there are likely to be fixed cost elements to monitoring and information gathering. It also V usies inver:;cly with how developed the tnuiial system is in the Sou:hern country. For ina.ny investments, such as purchases of stock sold in a highly developed stock market, this Here the possible investments are ranked from lowest cost to highest cost, so that :'(WL' ). the marginal tesource cost of Northern portfolio investment in the South. is non.
decreasing and is assumed to be positive whenever WVNS is positive. The value of luis cost may be zero for some inveitments. For expositional convenience, I assume that there is some positive cost for any Northern investment in the South, unless it is a direct investment.
c'(WSN) is zero when WSN is positive and increases with increasing negative values of
WSN2
It, is also assumed that some Northerners have exclusive access to certain technologies that can be profitably applied in the Southern country. This advantage could be exploited by exporting products that embody the knowledge or by licensing the technology to Southern firms. I assume instead that, for reasons not addressed here, the Northern owner of the technology retains direct control over it by operating a branch or subsidiary. To simplify the model, I further assume that the parent firm wholly owns the subsidiary. To simplify the exposition, I refer to the Northern direct investment as the high-tech (1-) sector, and the remaining Southern economy, in which Northerners may make portfolio investments, as the low-tech sector (L).
Notation
I use the following notation:
KS: capital invested in hth sector located in South h = H ,L
2 The assumption that cross-border wealtholdings are subject to increasing monitoring costs places a limit on the tax arbitrage profits that would otherwise be unbounded due tothe differential taxation of investments. As Slemrod (1988) elaborates, whenever the relative rate of tax on investments is different for different investors, some investor will find one investment to dominate another in terms of after-tax return. In a riskless world, this opens the possibility of unlimited tax arbitrage profits by holding a short position in the loweryielding asset and a long position in the higher-yielding asset. This failure of equilibrium can be eliminated by putting arbitrary restrictions on short holdings. as in Slemrod (1988), or by introducing an increasing cost to extreme portfolio positions. The model of this paper appeals to increasing monitoring costs of cross-border holdings. An alternative modelling strategy is to introduce risk aversion and residence-specific risk. In this case, arbitrage profits would be limited by investors' aversion to portfolios which are insufficiently diversified among the capital of various countries. In essence, an increasing risk premium would replace the increasing monitoring costs as the limit on cross-border holdings. The analytical disadvantage of this modelling strategy is that, in the presence of risk, taxation takes an insurance dimension which is difficult to disentangle from its revenue-raising function. An alternative approach is to assume that foreign investment is subject to a risk of expropriation by the host country which increases (because its attractiveness increases) with the total volume of foreign investment.
-4- low-tech production function rN: pre-tax rate of return earned on capital located in the North
The identity relationships that link the wealth and capital stock variables are suimmarized in Figure 1 .
FIGURE 1
By assumption, Southerners do not own high-tech capital in their country, so that 
where v = (I -y) u + -pnax(u, t).
Equilibrium for the world economy is characterized by capital stock and wealth allocations such that both investors are in investment equilibrium.
No-Tax Equilibrium
As a prelude to the characterization of equilibrium with taxes, it is worthwhile to 
Equilibrium with Taxes
The pair of tax systems described earlier puts a penalty on the income from all capital holdings except for one type--there is no tax on Southern ownership of Northern 
THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE EQUILIBRIUM
Assume that WSN>0 and WLNS > 0, so that c'(WSN) and c"(WSN) are zero, and c'(WLNS)> 0. Taking the total derivatives of (1), (2a), and (2b), but holding t constant,
I first solve for the changes in capital and wealth holdings in terms of du and dv. Note that c' and c" refer to c'(W N) and c"(W NS), respectively. Using the fact that 
or, rearranging terms slightly,
whereIa-du-I-and a'
=-v when u < v and a'= 0 if u> v.
It is useful for interpreting expressions (7a) and (7b) to consider two cases. In the first case Southern taxation exceeds Northern taxation, i.e., u > t. In this case the total 1 1 1 effective tax on Northern investment in the South is simply the Southern rate u. Thus v = u, a = 1 -t and a'= 0. Then (7a) reduces to
The first two terms of expression (8) When u increases, dKH and dK 5 will be unambiguously negative, implying a welfare loss. Both components of the third term may be of either sign, as may be the third temi itself.
Thus, increasing u beyond t causes a welfare loss due to reducing the domestic capital stock below its efficient size, but there may be an offsetting increase in welfare if it induces the country to make tax arbitrage profits by in essence borrowing at the after-tax world rate of interest and investing at the pre-tax rate of interest.
I turn now to the case where u is less than t (and v). Because the Northern investors are partially subject to a foreign tax credit, increases in u raise revenue from
Northern investors that are not completely reflected in decreases in their after-tax rate of return. To the extent that the foreign tax credit is operative (T close to one), increases in tax paid to the Southern Government are offset by tax credits granted by the Northern govemment.
First assume that the foreign tax credit is complete, so that y = 1, v = t, a =1 -u, and a' = -1 . Referring to expression (7a) for the change in national income, it is clear that each of the three terms in expression (8) A change in u will have no effect on KH, so that the first term is irrelevant. An increase in u will, though, decrease domestic investment in domestic capital, pushing up g', which attracts foreign investment in domestic capital. Total domestic capital will be lower, though, because the increased Northern investment pushes up c'--the same capital is less attractive to the Northern wealth owner than to the Southern wealth owner. So, with respect to an increase in u, (KSH =0, dKL <0, and dWSN > 0.
The welfare implications of these changes are different than the case when u > t, L though. A decrease in KS is less deleterious because the cost to the South of foreign investment is rN(1 -u) + c', which is greater than rN(l -t) + c' when u < t. This is because, in order to earn rN(1 -t) after all taxes, the Northern investor must still be paid rN + c' before any taxes. When u < t, though, the Southern government claims only urN of this return, while the Northern government receives (t -u)rN. Thus the net cost to the (1 -t)rN and invest in the North to earn rN. When u < t, the cost of borrowing is (1 -u)rN, so that the tax arbitrage gain is urN, which is less than trN. 
CAN THE NORTH HELP TILE SOUTH
(2b) f(Ks)=rN(I t).
Differentiating with respect to w yields: 
SHOULD TIlE SOUTH TRY TO TAX ITS RESIDENTS'
FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME?
Up to now I have assumed that the Southern government cannot collect any tax on its residents' foreign-source capital income. More generally, it can raise some tax revenue, but only at a substantial resource cost. Should it levy such a tax and, if so, at what rate?
Let z be the tax on foreign-source income, and let e(z) be the resource cost of levying a tax at rate z. Using the same type of reasoning as above, the change in Southem welfare with respect to z can be written as The allocational effects of increasing z are identical to that of increasing w, so that Thus, expression (14) looks quite similar to that of (k dw dz dw (13). The key difference (other than the absence of terms including w, which is assumed to be zero) is that the tern -WSN is absent from (14). When the Southern government imposes the tax instead of the Northern government, the tax revenue does not represent a loss to the economy. Expression (14) does include the tenn -e'(z), which is the marginal dYs resource cost of imposing a tax of z. If, when evaluated at z equal to zero, z is negative, then the optimal z is zero--the gain from a more efficient level of the domestic dYi capital stock is more than offset by the resource cost of raising z. If -is positive at z = dY 5 0, then the optimal z occurs at that positive value of z where --is zero.
If the Southern government had to choose between trying to enforce a tax on its
residents' foreign-source income or having the North do it for them, the choice boils down to a comparison of the cost of enforcement, e(z), and the revenue loss, WSN. The best of all worlds is for the North to impose the tax but refund it to the Southern government. This saves the South the cost of enforcement but allows them to retain the revenue.
The analysis to this point assumes that the Southern government has an alternative source of revenue which has no distortionary impact. If this unrealistic assumption is abandoned, any revenue increases due to tax policy changes increase national income, because they allow the government to reduce other distortionary taxes. Incorporating this consideration into the analysis would be straightforward and would, for example, make imposing a residence-based tax look better compared to the Northern withholding tax.
WORLD EFFICIENCY
Taxes can cause the worldwide allocation of capital and wealth to fail to achieve Pareto efficiency. To see this, first consider that Northern welfare can be written as 
National income of the Southern country is
Adding (16b) and (17b), and using the equilibrium conditions (1), (2a), and (2b), yields
Maximizing YW with respect to K yields the familiar condition in WNS have no monitoring cost effect, the accompanying decline in WSN (increased Southern borrowing) does increase monitoring costs. As demonstrated earlier, the global efficiency conditions will be satisfied in a no-tax equtlibrium. They will also be satisfied if North and South both operate a source-based tax with equal rates so that t = u = w and y=0 so that v = u.
If both countries operate residence-based taxes (with equal or unequal rates), so thatu = z, v = t, and w = 0, the first-order conditions (19a) and ( 
